Add checks for $a->user existence

- Variable can be empty/null in many cases
This commit is contained in:
Hypolite Petovan 2020-07-09 15:08:09 -04:00
parent ad66a92deb
commit cb03418937
4 changed files with 8 additions and 8 deletions

View file

@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ class Page implements ArrayAccess
// If you're just visiting, let javascript take you home
if (!empty($_SESSION['visitor_home'])) {
$homebase = $_SESSION['visitor_home'];
} elseif (local_user()) {
} elseif (!empty($app->user['nickname'])) {
$homebase = 'profile/' . $app->user['nickname'];
}

View file

@ -96,11 +96,11 @@ abstract class BaseModule
* Functions used to protect against Cross-Site Request Forgery
* The security token has to base on at least one value that an attacker can't know - here it's the session ID and the private key.
* In this implementation, a security token is reusable (if the user submits a form, goes back and resubmits the form, maybe with small changes;
* or if the security token is used for ajax-calls that happen several times), but only valid for a certain amout of time (3hours).
* The "typename" seperates the security tokens of different types of forms. This could be relevant in the following case:
* A security token is used to protekt a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link).
* or if the security token is used for ajax-calls that happen several times), but only valid for a certain amount of time (3hours).
* The "typename" separates the security tokens of different types of forms. This could be relevant in the following case:
* A security token is used to protect a link from CSRF (e.g. the "delete this profile"-link).
* If the new page contains by any chance external elements, then the used security token is exposed by the referrer.
* Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but somethimes they still are,
* Actually, important actions should not be triggered by Links / GET-Requests at all, but sometimes they still are,
* so this mechanism brings in some damage control (the attacker would be able to forge a request to a form of this type, but not to forms of other types).
*/
public static function getFormSecurityToken($typename = '')
@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ abstract class BaseModule
$a = DI::app();
$timestamp = time();
$sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', $a->user['guid'] . $a->user['prvkey'] . session_id() . $timestamp . $typename);
$sec_hash = hash('whirlpool', ($a->user['guid'] ?? '') . ($a->user['prvkey'] ?? '') . session_id() . $timestamp . $typename);
return $timestamp . '.' . $sec_hash;
}

View file

@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ function frio_remote_nav($a, &$nav)
// since $userinfo isn't available for the hook we write it to the nav array
// this isn't optimal because the contact query will be done now twice
if (local_user()) {
if (local_user() && !empty($a->user['uid'])) {
// empty the server url for local user because we won't need it
$server_url = '';
// user info

View file

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ function vier_init(App $a)
Renderer::setActiveTemplateEngine('smarty3');
if (!empty($a->argv[0]) && ($a->argv[0] . ($a->argv[1] ?? '')) === ('profile' . $a->user['nickname']) || $a->argv[0] === 'network' && local_user()) {
if (!empty($a->argv[0]) && ($a->argv[0] . ($a->argv[1] ?? '')) === ('profile' . ($a->user['nickname'] ?? '')) || $a->argv[0] === 'network' && local_user()) {
vier_community_info();
DI::page()['htmlhead'] .= "<link rel='stylesheet' type='text/css' href='view/theme/vier/wide.css' media='screen and (min-width: 1300px)'/>\n";